Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize.

Still am, Mr. Chairman. To my pleasure, but the

chagrin of some.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome, and thank you very much for being

here with us. I appreciate the many conversations you and I have

had. I appreciate your confidences during that period, and I also

want to express my respect for the great effort that you made

under difficult circumstances to try to see that the words spoken

in the U.N. and by politicians had some meaning, and that can

sometimes be a difficult task.

There is a huge irony, I think maybe not so big to some, but I

am looking around here. We are talking about the same Saddam

Hussein who was equated by some to Hitler. We were willing to

marshal an entire Army to prevent him from doing certain things

in the region, and there was an urgency in the aftermath of that,

to contain the proliferation, the strategic threat that this individual

represented to the world, an urgency that has led us to fly no-fly

missions since that time, put American forces at risk, to continue

to be dropping bombs and firing missiles, and yet there is not a lot

of interest in this, not a lot of colleagues here today. And in fact,

most of the world seems to have backed off from the realities of the

threat that this individual and his acquisition of weapons of mass

destruction represent.

I personally believe that nothing has changed. I think you share

that belief?

I think we are exactly in the same situation we

were when all of this urgency was expressed by so many people.

We are in exactly the same situation, except that we have had now

1 year without any inspections. You were concerned during the

time that you had inspections that he was capable of continuing to

employ subterfuge and guile and all kind of tricks in order to continue

to build weapons. And I think the assumption of most people

in the intelligence community is that that is exactly what he has

been doing, is that correct?

Is there any indication to the contrary?

So in fact the threat that was sufficient to summon

all of this international outrage and the very precise and clear

goals, as clear as any goals I have ever seen the U.N. state, that

threat is in fact greater today than it was then, is it not?

So what has happened? Have we been bamboozled?

Is our policy simply a failure? Are we frightened? Is there something

that has changed in the nature of this threat? Because I really

do not understand it.

And it seems to me that for the cause of nonproliferation, whether

it is with respect to Iraq or any other number of countries about

which we have enormous concerns, the message that comes out of

this is that maybe the forces aligned to try to hold people accountable

are in fact paper tigers, and not serious about it.

Mr. Chairman, I do have some more questions,

but maybe we will have another round, if I may ask them then.

Thanks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do I understand your

position to be, Mr. Ambassador, that if the real inspection protocol

put forward now were to be implemented, if they did surprise you

and accept it, that you would be satisfied with that inspection regime

sufficiently—if lifting the sanctions is what it takes to get

that real regime, you would take that deal?

The argument can be made that if you can get

that real inspection, and you have agreed it is a real inspection, so

if that is the inspection that we are agreed to over a 4-month period,

you can raise the profile of the issue again and begin a process——

continuing]. Of focusing on the inspections,

which is nonexistent today. I would assume that you would agree

that if it is really going to be a rolling 4-month, that you are better

off testing a real one. Now I agree with the chairman. I do not

think any inspection is worth anything, if it is just any. It has to

be satisfactory to those who make the tough judgments of whether

or not they are getting the answers.

We are back to where we were.

The question is whether or not if we go back to

where we were, having reasserted the principle and recommitted

ourselves to that outcome, whether or not we might have the staying

power and the courage to proceed forward. I mean, I would

rather have it refocused on and re-energized, than continue down

the road we are on today, which I think is far more dangerous.

I am convinced. As many of us predicted, I think

yourself included, that, although quietly and privately, that it

would almost certainly come in the last round. And the question

was always what are we prepared, we the international community,

prepared to do about it.

Let me ask you another question. It is a little bit sensitive because

this is the place where we are having some disagreements

on it. But I have heard from many people when I talked to people

in the international community as we try to leverage a coalition on

this, that people say, well, you know, your hands are not very

clean, you the United States, because, of course, we have not joined

the community of nations in the comprehensive test ban.

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not this is something

you feel leverages against us and has a negative impact on our

moral suasion or other capacities to, if not real capacities, to argue

for a stronger proliferation regime internationally—anti-proliferation

regime?

Mr. Chairman could I have your indulgence just

to continue?

Thank you, sir. When we came to one of the

early confrontations a year and a half, 2 years ago, I don’t remember

exactly when in time now, many of our former allies in the coalition

that President Bush put together expressed a willingness to

go the distance, but only if the United States, and Great Britain,

obviously, were really prepared to do so. And it was their lack of

a sense that we would be there when it finished that held them

back, and then we began to hear that it was hard to put the coalition

together again. And I wonder if it is your perception which

came first, sort of the reluctance to participate in the coalition, or

the perception that the United States or Great Britain were not

prepared to go the distance and, therefore, they too sort of looked

to the longer term and a different approach?

But you are familiar. You know the equation?

Well, do you think the coalition could have been

put back together, let me just ask you that bluntly, to uphold the

full measures of what the United Nations resolution called for?

Or was it impossible?

Well, I thank the chair and I thank you again.

I just, as a parting comment, I mean, the strategic exigencies that

brought us to understand that it was unacceptable to have the invasion

of Kuwait, which was cloaked in a certain amount of rhetoric,

was far more oriented toward longer-term implications of the

potential of his moving further south, oilfields, economy, as Jim

Baker said back then, it is about jobs, and then they found other

rhetoric to couch it in, but that was a code word for those oilfields,

and I think the longer-term strategic implications of the Middle

East.

Now, that was sufficient to bring all of us to believe, though timing

was questioned, that we had to be prepared to use force. And

we ultimately did. It seems to me that a Saddam Hussein who has

the ability to develop potentially more threatening weapons of

mass destruction, notwithstanding—I mean, it was the show of

force and the determination of the United States that really took

away from him that option previously. If that determination is not

there, then the use that he put it to previously in other circumstances

could become far more attractive again in the future,

which I think is the bottom line of what you were saying.

So I think we are—and I thank the chair for having this hearing—

I mean, I think we are talking about a very significant and

large strategic interest to the United States that for various reasons

has been second tiered to more emotional and certainly of-themoment

perceptions of other issues that do not rise to the same

strategic, longer-term interests of our country.

So I think it is important for us to be thinking about where we

go because I have said, and I think you and others have said, as

long as he is there, and it may well be that the Iraqi people will

settle that, but as long as he is there, I think most people understand

that that threat remains and it is real, so—and there is a

time of confrontation. So I think we are better to do it sooner rather

than later and to be real about our resolve. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.